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Abstract The European Commission  and the  EU Council  Secretariat  support  the  
Member States in the conduct of European foreign policy, yet they have not always been  
able  to  get  along.  This  article  gives  an  overview  of  their  inter-institutional  relations  
across history, foreign policy instruments (declarations, crisis management joint actions  
and representation) and regions. The main argument is that the relationship between both  
institutions is generally cooperative,  but that tensions do arise in a limited number of  
cases  where  the  roles  of  the  Commission  and  the  Council  Secretariat  are  unclear,  
perceived to overlap or in competition. In these instances, they have generally found a  
modus vivendi and their inter-institutional  relations have subsequently improved. Such  
informal arrangements do not address, however, the underlying structural problems – that  
the Council Secretariat challenges the Commission’s political and informational role in  
the  context  of  foreign  policy.  Differences  between  both  institutions  are  therefore  still  
regularly displayed. This continues to undermine EU consistency and its effectiveness in  
international relations.
I Introduction
Inter-institutional  relations  are  often  complicated.  Whereas  institutional  cooperation  is 
regularly a prerequisite for effectiveness, the promotion of self-interest sometimes limits 
success. The relationship between the European Commission and Javier Solana’s Council 
Secretariat can be framed in these terms when it comes to European foreign policy. Both 
institutions are responsible for supporting the Member States, yet they have not always 
been able to get along. Various articles have made mention of consistency problems – if 
not ‘turf battles’ – with all the accompanying consequences for the position of the EU in 
the world.1 What most scholars, however, have not provided is a systematic analysis of the 
relationship between both institutions.
* This article is based on forty interviews with (former) officials from the European Commission, the 
Council Secretariat and the Member States. It discusses European foreign policy rather than the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy, as it is often the cross-pillar dossiers that lead to tensions.
1 D. Allen, ‘'Who speaks for Europe?': the search for an effective and coherent external policy’ in J. Peterson  
and H. Sjursen (eds) A common foreign policy for Europe? Competing visions of the CFSP (Routledge, 
London, 1998); B. Crowe, ‘A common European foreign policy after Iraq?’ (2003) 79 International Affairs, 
pp. 533-46; S. Duke and S. Vanhoonacker, ‘Administrative Governance in the CFSP: Development and 
Practice’ (2006) 11 EFA Rev., pp. 163–182; D. Spence, ‘The Commission and the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy’ in D. Spence and G. Edwards (eds) The European Commission (John Harper, London, 
2006).
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This article gives a comprehensive overview of inter-institutional relations between 
the European Commission and the Council Secretariat in the context of European foreign 
policy across history, foreign policy instruments  (declarations,  crisis  management  joint 
actions and representation) and regions. It shows that the relations are particularly difficult 
in a number of cases, where the roles of both institutions are unclear, perceived to overlap, 
or in competition with one another. Such problems result, to some extent, from the very 
rationale with which the Member States have delegated tasks to both institutions. Since 
the appointment of Solana (1999), the Council Secretariat is pursuing to fill a vacuum left 
by the relative absence of the Commission in the political and informational aspects of 
European foreign policy.2 On the way, it has naturally met the Commission, which has felt 
that its role was being threatened. The Council Secretariat’s recent increase in standing 
thus took place in a divisive and competitive environment. Over time both institutions 
have found a modus vivendi and inter-institutional relations have improved. 
This article will  commence with a theoretical analysis  connecting insights from 
bureaucratic politics to rationalist accounts of delegation literature. This section is not so 
much intended as to generate testable theory-informed hypotheses, but rather to serve as a 
point of reference to structure the discussion. After the theoretical analysis, the article will 
discuss the variation in the roles of the Commission and the Council Secretariat across 
history, foreign policy instruments and regions from an empirical perspective. The article 
concludes with the main findings and puts the relationship between both institutions in the 
context of a broader debate. Before going, however, to the content of the article, it is worth  
reiterating that the purpose of the article is to provide an overview of the inter-institutional 
relations. As such, it cannot for obvious reasons discuss individual cases at great length. 
II Overlapping Functions and the Rationale for Delegation
An analysis of the inter-institutional relations between the European Commission and the 
Council Secretariat fits in with the study of bureaucratic politics, which mainly focuses on 
the rivalry between administrative bureaus.3 Bureaucratic politics has been studied in the 
context of comparative politics, international relations as well as the European Union.4 A 
key concept  in  this  perspective  is  the  idea  of  ‘territoriality’ within a  polity  –  be  it  a 
ministry, company or international organization.5 Each bureau performs a specific function 
and as a result it occupies some territory somewhere in this policy space. From this basic 
concept it can be derived that bureaus are likely to dispute over territory (and thus over the 
allocation  of  resources),  if  their  functions  are  unclear,  perceived to  overlap  or  are  in 
competition with one another.
In the study of the European Union, the concept of territoriality clearly comes back 
in the basic assumption – of amongst others most scholars in the rational choice tradition – 
that the institutions have fixed competence-maximizing preferences vis-à-vis the Member 
States.6 At  the  opposite  of  the  spectrum,  there  exists  a  strong  notion  in  bureaucratic 
2 H. Dijkstra, ‘The Council Secretariat’s Role in the Common Foreign and Security Policy’ (2008) 13 EFA 
Rev., pp. 149–166; S. Nuttall, European foreign policy (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000); Duke and 
Vanhoonacker, note 6 above.
3 T. Christiansen, ‘Tensions of European governance: politicized bureaucracy and multiple accountability in 
the European Commission’ (1997) 4 Journal of European Public Policy, pp. 73-90.
4 B.G. Peters, The Politics of Bureaucracy (Routledge, London, 2001); G.T. Allison, The Essence of  
Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Little Brown, Boston, 1971); B.G. Peters, ‘Bureaucratic 
Politics and the Institutions of the European Community’ in A.M. Sbragia (ed.) Euro-Politics: Institutions  
and Policymaking in the New European Community (Brookings Institution Press, Washington D.C., 1992).
5 A. Downs, Inside Bureaucracy (Little Brown, Boston, 1967).
6 G. Majone (ed.), Regulating Europe (Routledge, London, 1996); M.A. Pollack, The Engines of European 
Integration: Agency, Delegation, and. Agenda Setting in the EU (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003).
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politics on the need to defend one’s perceived territory due to survival concerns. Such 
territory ranges from a bureau’s heartland – its core  raison d’être – to its periphery; the 
heartland  is  clearly  the  most  worth  fighting  for.7 With  respect  to  defending  territory, 
scholars of bureaucratic politics draw extensively on the discipline of economics, which 
has studied the entry barriers to the market entrants are likely to face resulting from fierce 
resistance from the incumbent monopolist.8 If such resistance does not have the desired 
effect, the incumbent is likely to readjust its position leading to a new institutional balance 
of power.9
When  it  comes  to  the  inter-institutional  relations  of  the  Commission  and  the 
Council Secretariat in foreign policy, the disputes over territory between both bureaus are 
thus likely to be higher across history, foreign policy instruments and regions, when their 
functions  are  unclear,  perceived  to  overlap  or  are  in  competition.10 It  is  furthermore 
expected that the incumbent  bureaucracy – which is in this case the Commission – is 
likely to try to resist entrant bureaucracies, particularly when the function of the entrant 
bureaucracy comes too close to the heartland of the incumbent. When the entrant does 
succeed, it is expected that the incumbent will have to readjust. The main challenge, in 
short, is thus to determine the functions of the both bureaucracies. It is, in this respect,  
fruitful to connect the insights of bureaucratic politics with the rational choice literature on 
delegation,  which  has  important  things  to  say  about  the  roles  of  the  supranational 
institutions and is quintessentially functionalist itself.11
Rational choice institutionalism sees the creation of supranational institutions as 
functional solutions for the Member States to reduce their transaction costs of cooperation, 
resulting from the fact that they have limited cognitive skills, incomplete information and 
that  there  is  generally  uncertainty  about  the  future.  Oliver  Williamson  usefully 
distinguishes between  ex ante and  ex post transaction costs.12 Ex ante transaction costs 
include the costs involved in drafting and negotiating an efficient agreement, which is 
close to the Pareto-optimum, while  ex post costs relate to implementation and ensuring 
that  the  agreed  distribution  is  actually  achieved.  Furthermore  for  an  agreement  to  be 
efficient, consistency with other agreements and continuity over time is required. Rational 
choice  institutionalists  claim  that  supranational  institutions  can  help  to  reduce  these 
information, negotiation and compliance costs of cooperation, yet that they fulfil different 
roles per cost category.13 These roles will now be discussed in turn.
When  negotiating or  implementing complex legislation,  the Member States  are 
likely to face significant information costs. In order to reach an efficient outcome, reliable 
unbiased information is usually required during the ex ante stage. An expert bureaucracy 
can  provide  such information  in  areas,  which  are technically  complex and moderately 
divisive among Member States; an international secretariat can guarantee some continuity 
7 Downs, see note 5, p. 214.
8 For example: Downs, see note 5; Peters (2001), see note 4.
9 A.O. Hirschmann, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States 
(Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1970).
10 Cf. N. Klein, ‘Conceptualising the EU as a Civil-Military Crisis Manager: Institutional Actors and Their 
Principals’, paper presented at UACES annual conference in Edinburgh, 1-3 September 2008.
11 M.A. Pollack, ‘Delegation, agency, and agenda-setting in the European Community’ (1997) 51 
International Organization, pp. 99-134; The Council Secretariat is conceptualized as a supranational 
institution, because most observers regard it as an actor in its own right.
12 O.E. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relations, Contracting (The 
Free Press, New York, 1985).
13 A. Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: social purpose and state power from Messina to Maastricht 
(Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1998); J. Tallberg, Leadership and Negotiation in the European Union 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006); D. Beach, The Dynamics of European Integration: Why  
and when EU institutions matter (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2005); Pollack, see note 6.
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and  consistency  through  its  long-term involvement.14 Furthermore  when  the  policy  is 
relatively non-divisive, Member States can ‘outsource’ implementation and representation 
powers to an expert bureaucracy or international secretariat out of efficiency concerns.15 
Sustaining a single supranational institution is, after all, more efficient than twenty-seven 
and leaving the details  to an executive,  furthermore,  relieves  the Member States from 
over-involvement.
Apart from informational input, Member States often also fail to reach an efficient 
agreement due to high costs involved in the negotiation process. These costs are twofold.16 
Firstly, Member States have to determine their preferences, have to come to Brussels, sit 
in lengthy and tiresome negotiation sessions, coordinate horizontally and vertically, and 
translate and distribute their documents. Giving the thousands of annual meetings, these 
costs  are  substantial.  Many multilateral  negotiations furthermore  fail  as  a  result  of  an 
inefficient agenda and poor chairmanship. Secondly, Member States have an incentive not 
to reveal their bottom lines, which can lead to negotiation failure despite not necessarily 
conflicting preferences.  International secretariats can help by substantially reducing the 
basic negotiation costs, helping to shape the agenda and performing neutral  brokerage. 
Through their  longer-term involvement,  they are often in a good position to point  the 
Member States at how to best make use of the game.
Lastly, due to uncertainty about the future, Member States generally face the risk 
of  non-compliance  and  the  problem  of  incomplete  contracting.17 Since  many  salient 
dossiers require domestic compliance,  there is often a need for a neutral supranational 
third party,  which monitors the actual implementation.  Similarly,  a supranational court 
with enforcement powers can also reduce the compliance costs. Because every complex 
contract  is  furthermore  incomplete  under  the bounded rationality  assumption,  Member 
States are likely to demand credible commitments from other parties through structuring 
each other’s future domestic incentive by means of pooling and delegating sovereignty.18 
While not equally applicable to all policy areas, the reasons for delegation are thus diverse 
and  the  roles  of  the  supranational  institutions  vary  accordingly.  In  this  respect,  the 
Commission and the Council Secretariat are likely to dispute about territory, if they feel 
that these reasons for delegation overlap.
III Historical Comparison
European Political Cooperation (EPC) – the predecessor policy of the CFSP – was created 
along intergovernmental lines as a coordination mechanism through which the  Member 
States could achieve ‘politics of scale’.19 By coordinating their foreign policy positions, 
they  collectively  hoped  to  punch  above  their  individual  weight  in  world  affairs.  The 
voluntary nature of these arrangements and the case-by-case basis should be noted. When 
the Member States agreed, Europe acted as one and all reaped the benefits; otherwise they 
‘agreed to disagree’ and dealt with the issue unilaterally. Because the EPC represented a 
positive-sum game with often direct implementation through declarations, there was no 
functional need for supranational institutions to reduce possible non-compliance costs.20 
While incomplete contracting and uncertainty are furthermore inherent features of foreign 
14 Moravcsik, see note 13, p. 73; Pollack, see note 6, p. 63.
15 G. Majone, ‘Two Logics of Delegation: Agency and Fiduciary Relations in EU Governance’ (2001) 2 
European Union Politics, pp. 103-22.
16 Tallberg; Beach, see note 13.
17 Moravcsik, see note 13; Pollack, see note 6.
18 Williamson, see note 12; Moravcsik, see note 13.
19 R. Ginsberg, Foreign Policy Actions of the European Community: The Politics of Scale (Lynne Rienner, 
Boulder, 1989).
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policy coordination, the Member States under EPC simply met again to fill in the details 
or to reformulate their policy. In order words, ex post transaction costs were initially not a 
major cause of concern. 
The Member States realized, however, from the outset the importance of reducing 
ex ante transaction costs. Because of the continuous negotiations, there was a clear need 
for administrative support and for efficient decision-making. Yet their reluctance to give 
up sovereignty led them to carry the burden themselves through the Presidency.21 As the 
decision-making  costs  became  more  pressing  over  the  years,  so  was  the  call  for 
administrative support. Three years after the creation of EPC, the Member States already 
noted that the administrative tasks presented a heavy burden for the Presidency, but little 
was done to alleviate it.22 Some improvement came with the establishment of the Troika 
Secretariat  (1981),  in  which  the  incoming  and  preceding  Presidency  seconded  a  civil 
servant to the Presidency-in-office. After the breakdown of the EPC machinery, as a result 
of the Russian invasion in Afghanistan (1979), this brought some necessary continuity 
between Presidencies as much as it reduced the administrative costs. When the Member 
States finally created a permanent secretariat under the Single European Act (1987), it was 
to further reduce the burden of the Presidency. During the first decades of foreign policy 
cooperation, they thus carefully weighted transaction costs and perceived sovereignty loss.
While  the  European  Commission  was  kept  at  arms  length  in  EPC,  it  was  not 
completely ignored. In boundaries dossiers between European Political Cooperation and 
the activities of the European Communities, the ‘Commission [was to] be consulted’.23 It 
was thus sitting at the table when cross-pillar issues were discussed in order to promote 
some consistency: it played a role when the Member States talked about sanctions; when 
Community  instruments  were  required  for  the  political  aims  of  EPC;  and  during  the 
association negotiations with, and as coordinator for international aid for, the Central and 
Eastern European countries after 1989. Through its Community expertise, its delegations 
and access to Community funding the European Commission tried to make a constructive 
contribution in order to further its competences in foreign policy cooperation. The strategy 
worked: whereas in the 1970s it had to fight for every invitation, in 1981 it became ‘fully 
associated’ with EPC, and by the end of the 1980s it was participating on major dossiers. 24 
Cross-pillar consistency and Community input was its raison d’être.
The involvement of the Commission in these boundary dossiers covered part of the 
informational need. While its role during the negotiations on the economic basket of the 
CSCE/OSCE started divisively, even France recognized that the Commission’s input was 
indispensible.25 Similarly, while Kohl and Mitterrand were quarrelling over the political 
desirability of German unification (1990), Commission officials worked many extra hours 
during the summer to make the integration of the GDR into the Communities technically 
happen.26 The  scope  of  the  Commission’s  input,  needless  to  say,  remained  limited  to 
boundary cases. The informational demand in non-boundary dossiers was covered by the 
Correspondence Européenne (COREU), the encrypted telex information exchange system. 
20 W. Wagner, ‘Why the EU’s Common Foreign Policy Will Remain Intergovernmental: A Rationalist 
Institutionalist Choice Analysis of European Crisis Management Policy’ (2003) 10 Journal of European 
Public Policy, pp. 576-595.
21 S. Nuttall, European Political Co-operation (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992).
22 Copenhagen report (1973), art. 8.
23 Luxembourg Report (1970), art. 5.
24 Nuttall, see note 21.
25 S. Nuttall, ‘The Commission and foreign policy-making’ in G. Edwards and D. Spence (eds) The 
European Commission (Cartermill International, London, 1997); interview with national official.
26 Interview with national and Commission officials.
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Since purely EPC declarations and actions lacked technical complexity, this was at the 
time sufficient.
The Single European Act marked a first watershed for the institutional machinery 
of EPC. The establishment of a modest independent Brussels-based EPC Secretariat meant 
that some activity – at the lower level – moved from the capitals to Brussels.27 While this 
new Secretariat’s main task was to assist the Presidency in administrative duties, it also 
informally became the ‘guardian of the orthodoxy’, the prime contact for third parties in 
Brussels  (e.g.  European  Parliament;  press  corps),  and  it  engaged  in  some  limited 
conceptual  work for  the  Presidency.28 In  a  comparable  fashion with  the  delegation  of 
administrative duties to the Presidency at the start of EPC, tasks were now delegated from 
Presidency to the EPC Secretariat. On the Commission’s side, the handful of individuals 
from its General-Secretariat, dealing with EPC, were grouped into an EPC Directorate, in 
charge of coordinating the input of the relevant Directorates-General. This reflected the 
increase in activity since the early 1980s.
As the  Commission  was  still  primarily  looking  after  consistency  and the  EPC 
Secretariat was providing administrative support during the decision-making phase, their 
functions had little overlap. The Secretariat took over tasks from the Presidency and the 
European Correspondents,  but  not  from the  European  Commission.29 While  there  was 
some resentment in the Commission about the creation of the EPC Secretariat, it did not 
lead to bureaucratic rivalry. The division of tasks was clear and the creation of the EPC 
Secretariat was not a direct threat to the informational role of the Commission. If inter-
institutional tensions occurred, they were at the time between the Member States and the 
Commission. When the latter, for example, became the coordinator of international aid to 
Poland and Hungary (1989) this was despite strong French resistance. These new tasks 
subsequently improved the Commission’s standing and informational expertise in EPC. 
Whereas  foreign policy was  not  the  main  issue during  the  negotiations  on  the 
Single European Act, it took the centre stage during the Intergovernmental Conference on 
the  European Union (1991).  Pivotal  was the  institutional  structure of  the  Union – i.e. 
whether a  unified structure should combine  the Community and EPC or whether they 
should remain separate. The Member States eventually opted for the latter. Some felt the 
need to constrain the Commission after it had taken a leadership role in the events of 1989.
30 The  pillar  structure  implied  different  decision-making procedures  with  only  limited 
involvement for the Community institutions in the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP). In an attempt to reach out to the integrationist Member States, the Commission 
did gain the shared  right of initiative  and its ‘full  association’ was reiterated.  Its  role, 
nonetheless, remained secondary and it had to accept that it would not be at the helm of 
foreign policy cooperation.
Despite the general disappointment with Maastricht, an independent Directorate-
General  1A (external  political  relations)  was  established  within  the  Commission  to 
strengthen its position. For various reasons such as staff constraints, internal bureaucratic 
conflict, and ratification delay, these ‘new arrangements caused more problems than they 
brought  benefits’.31 Such  problems  are  frequently  mentioned  as  factors  hindering  the 
Commission from making a constructive contribution under Maastricht, although this is 
27 Cf. ‘Brusselization’, Allen, see note 1.
28 P.S. Da Costa Pereira, ‘The Use of a Secretariat’ in A. Pijpers, E. Regelsberger and W. Wessels (eds)  
European Political Cooperation in the 1980s: A Common Foreign Policy for Western Europe? (Martinus 
Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1988).
29 The European Correspondents coordinate the national positions in the capitals and previously also 
provided administrative support to the decision-making process.
30 Interviews with national and Commission officials.
31 Nuttall, see note 25, p. 317.
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denied by various senior officials.32 A related question remains  its restricted use of its 
newly-gained shared right of initiative. Some argue that the Commission was reluctant to 
confront the Member States fearing that they would not take its proposals serious due to 
its limited foreign policy expertise; one Council Secretariat interviewee, however, goes as 
far as  to  claim that  the Commission  was simple  obstructing the  whole process,  as its 
political leadership believed that CFSP ‘was not the right tool’.33
What ever the reason for its limited input in the CFSP, the fact is that the European 
Commission was not forthcoming. The initiative after Maastricht thus remained with the 
Presidency.  As  European  foreign  policy  grew  more  complex,  the  Presidency  in  turn 
increasingly  started  looking  at  the  Council  Secretariat’s  CFSP unit  for  administrative 
support and informational input.34 Due to their longer-term engagement, the officials from 
the Council Secretariat had gained a good overview of the Member States’ interests on the 
various dossiers. It thus became for the Presidency a modest source of ‘content expertise’ 
in addition to its ‘process expertise’.35 While the Council Secretariat was clearly engaging 
in conceptual work – the Commission’s job – it was at the time still not seen as a real 
threat. If the Member States wanted to engage in anything more than declarations, they 
had to turn to the Commission, because actual implementation implied the use of first 
pillar  instruments.  As  an  official  put  it,  ‘out  of  an  inborn  distaste  for  too  much 
bureaucracy, we did not consider the idea that there might be a second executive’.36
IV Comparison of foreign policy instruments
If the Single European Act was a watershed, the Amsterdam Treaty (1999) marked a sea-
change for the machinery of European foreign policy. In a reaction to the EU’s failure over 
the Bosnian War (1992-1995), the Member States appointed a High Representative for the 
CFSP supported by a Policy Unit in Brussels and by EU Special Representatives (EUSR) 
on the ground. Within the Council Secretariat’s DG External Relations, the CFSP unit was 
furthermore merged with the regional trade and development units, which led to efficiency 
gains. When at the midst of the Kosovo intervention (1999), the Member States finally 
nominated Javier Solana – a high-level politician rather than a bureaucrat – it became clear  
that a second foreign policy executive was in the making. The perception at the time was 
that these developments would lead to tensions with the Commission.37 The Economist 
noted that ‘it is almost inevitable that [Javier Solana and Chris Patten] will wrangle about 
the content or the management of foreign policy … friends as they may be’.38 This section 
will discuss inter-institutional relations post-Amsterdam across foreign policy instruments. 
It  will  distinguish  between  declarations,  crisis  management  (i.e.  joint  actions)  and 
representation.
1. Declaratory foreign policy: the political level
Despite only relatively little personal contact, the tensions at the political level have been 
surprisingly limited. Solana was mainly busy with establishing his position  vis-à-vis the 
Presidency, while Patten reorganized the Commission’s aid budgets, external delegations 
32 S. Duke, ‘The Commission and the CFSP’, EIPA Working Paper, 2006; Nuttall, see note 5. For the latter 
part: interviews with Commission officials.
33 Interviews with Commission and Council Secretariat officials.
34 The EPC Secretariat (now ‘CFSP unit’) was integrated into the Council Secretariat after Maastricht.
35 Beach; Tallberg, see note 13.
36 Interview with Commission official.
37 Crowe; Allen, see note 1.
38 The Economist, ‘Chris Patten, Becalmed in Brussels’, 2000.
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and gave at the same time some room to the new chief in town.39 Patten was reluctant to 
confront Solana and preferred the pragmatic road: ‘If [the ministers in the Council] were 
obliged to  choose  between backing Javier Solana  or  me,  there  was only one  possible 
outcome’.40 Instead of engaging in turf battles, the overall Solana-Patten message for their 
civil servants was clear: differences between both institutions cannot be displayed. Desk 
officers also learnt that consulting each other led to increasing returns.41 The Commission 
and the Council Secretariat furthermore often agreed on the content and they combined 
their strength. While it is a public secret that the relation with Ferrero-Waldner is not as 
good, and that she has regularly voiced her frustration, the consultative practices at the 
bureaucratic level have continued.
It is also worth noting that while the Amsterdam Treaty significantly strengthened 
the  Council  Secretariat,  the  basic  functional  roles  in  European  foreign  policy  did  not 
fundamentally change. The Treaty actually reiterated that the Council Secretariat and the 
Presidency were at the helm of the CFSP decision-making process – with more emphasis 
on  the  informational  role  –  while  the  Commission  continued  to  supply  the  necessary 
instruments for implementation under the first pillar. It was this division of labour and the 
system rather than Solana as such that became the target of Patten’s criticism. In a leaked 
discussion  note  for  the  College  of  Commissioners,  he  accused the  Member  States  of 
‘ringing  political  declarations,  which  they  are  subsequently  reluctant  to  underwrite  in 
money and staff. The Commission is left to wrestle with the contradictions, and blamed 
for inadequate outcomes’.42 Patten intended to send a marker to the Member States, but 
Solana took the note very personal.43
The EU’s conduct of high-level diplomacy did change since the creation of the 
High Representative. Whereas before Amsterdam the Troika played a crucial role, Solana 
these days hardly ever travels with the Presidency and the Commission to crisis regions.44 
In Macedonia (2001), Ukraine (2004), and Lebanon (2006) he went alone. When third 
countries are not in a state of crisis, representation is divided between the Commission and 
the Council Secretariat on the basis of competences.  Yet as stated above, the problems 
with regard to representation were with the Presidency rather than with the Commission. 
The whole range of (informal) bodies through which the EU participates in international 
diplomacy, such as the Contact Group, the Quint (EU4+US), the Quartet (on the Middle-
East) and the EU3+3 (on Iran) is also worth mentioning. The Council Secretariat is closely 
involved  in  the  work  of  these  bodies;  in  case  of  the  Western  Balkans,  the  European 
Commission often works closely with the Council Secretariat.45 
2. Second pillar instruments: civilian crisis management and its demarcation
The political strengthening of the Council Secretariat after the Amsterdam Treaty cannot 
be  seen separate  from the  simultaneous developments  in  the  context  of  the  European 
Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). In an effort to make the second pillar operational – 
after the EU failed to make capabilities available during the Kosovo war (1999) – the 
Member States decided to create bureaucratic structures with significant content expertise 
in the Council Secretariat in support of future military operations. Due to the sensitive 
39 C. Patten, Not Quite the Diplomat: Home Truths about World Affairs (Allen Lane, London, 2005); Crowe; 
Spence, see note 1; interviews with Commission and Council Secretariat officials.
40 Patten, see note 39, p. 156.
41 Interviews with Commission and Council Secretariat officials.
42 Agence-Europe, ‘External Relations: Demands, Constraints and Priorities’, 10 June 2000.
43 Interview with Commission official.
44 Spence, see note 1.
45 Interviews with Commission and Council Secretariat officials.
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nature of such operations, the Member States kept the Commission completely at arms 
length, even delegating the budget management to the independent ATHENA mechanism 
consisting  of  national  and  Council  Secretariat  officials.  Although  the  Commission  is 
allowed  to  provide  some  input  into  the  military  deliberations,  its  influence  remains 
minimal. The Commission has not considered this problematic. Military operations do not 
duplicate first pillar instruments and the Commission’s own expertise is too limited to 
make a valuable contribution.46
Inter-institutional turf battles became, however, intense when the Member States 
added a civilian dimension to ESDP and started – from the Commission’s perspective – 
duplicating bureaucratic structures in support of these instruments (i.e. police, rule of law, 
civil administration and civil protection missions). The Commission had previously, after 
all, trained police services in the Palestinian Territories, Guatemala, South Africa, Albania, 
Algeria  and  Macedonia,  and  had  partially  financed  Kosovo’s  civil  administration 
(UNMIK).47 It also plays a central role in election monitoring and the Community has a 
legal basis in article 177(2) to ‘contribute to … developing and consolidating democracy 
and the rule of law’ in third countries. Lastly, the Humanitarian Office and the Monitoring 
and Information Centre (DG Environment) already do much in the field of civil protection 
with crisis management missions to Turkey, Iran, Morocco and the United States. 
The Commission thus saw the creation of these new expert bureaucracies in the 
Council Secretariat as the Member States trespassing on its territory. This was confirmed 
during  the  Aceh  Monitoring  Mission  (2005).  The  Commission  suggested  making  a 
substantial number of its own experts available for the mission, albeit under the political 
control of the Political and Security Committee. The Member States, however, refused any 
Commission  involvement:  it  could  pay  for  the  mission  with  the  CFSP budget;  not 
participate in it. For the Commission this was an important lesson learned.48 It has been 
emphasising the use of first pillar instruments in foreign policy ever since. The civilian 
crisis  management  services  of  the  Council  Secretariat,  on  the  other  hand,  were 
strengthened after Aceh as part of the post-Hampton Court reforms (2005). Through its 
control  of  the  CFSP budget,  the  Commission  nonetheless  remains  involved  and  this 
regularly causes friction with the officials from the Council Secretariat. Particularly in the 
Afghanistan  mission,  severe  delays  took  place,  since  many  administrative  vacancies 
remained unfilled, which meant that nobody on the ground was capable of fulfilling the 
stringent procurement rules of the European Commission.49
With the establishment of these new crisis management instruments, the question 
arose when to choose for first or second pillar instruments. The Commission feared that 
the Council would define everything as ‘security’ with the risk of ‘second-pillarisation’ at 
the  expense  of  development  and  humanitarian  assistance  issues.50 Its  legal  service 
therefore  felt  that  is  was  necessary  to  draw  the  line  between  Community  and  CFSP 
competences. On its own initiative rather than on the suggestion of a relevant Directorate-
General, it went to court over a Council Decision implementing the ECOWAS/small arms 
joint action. On the basis of article 47, the European Court of Justice recently ruled that in  
case of a double-objective (e.g. development and security) action must be taken under the 
Community. While nobody expected the Commission to go to court, this ruling did fill in a  
few blanks. The political effect of this ruling remains unknown, but it is fair to assume that  
Council Secretariat officials in the future will draft their proposals more carefully.
46 Interviews with Commission officials.
47 U.C. Schroeder, ‘Governance of EU Crisis Management’ in M. Emerson and E. Gross (eds), Evaluating 
the EU's Crisis Missions in the Balkans (Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, 2007).
48 Interview with Commission official.
49 Interviews with national, Commission and Council Secretariat officials.
50 Interviews with Commission officials.
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3. Representation on the ground: towards an External Action Service
Two years after Amsterdam, the Member States launched the Constitutional debate. One 
objective  was  to  make  European  foreign  policy  more  coherent.  From  the  very  start 
however, the Commission and the Council Secretariat disagreed on the means to achieve 
this end. There was general agreement on the merger of the posts of High Representative 
and Commissioner  for  External  Relations,  but  the  secondary  question  where this  post 
should be based caused problems. Even at the time of the Irish Referendum, this had not 
been  entirely  answered  leaving  the  physical  location  of  the  offices  of  the  new High 
Representative and his/her cabinet (Council or Commission buildings) an issue of debate. 
On the composition of the External Action Service and the European Union delegations, 
the Commission and the Council Secretariat also held different opinions: there was no 
agreement on whether the trade and the military services would be included and to what 
extent the Commission would take political posts in the EU delegations.
While  the  debates  proceeded,  the  Council  Secretariat  tried  to  implement  some 
interim measures. It was initially understaffed and it lacked the appropriate intelligence 
and representation on the ground. Increasing the number of EUSRs was one clever way of 
dealing with this caveat. They could represent the High Representative on the ground as 
well as doing some political reporting. Their support team of seconded national officials 
furthermore alleviated some of the staff problems in the Council Secretariat. While the 
Council Secretariat generally benefitted from the EUSRs, some have been perceived by 
the  Commission  as  an additional  layer  of  bureaucracy at  best  and as  a  threat to  their 
representational  function  at  worse.  On  a  personal  level,  the  Commission’s  Heads  of 
Delegations have often resented the EUSRs flying in from Brussels and demanding – in 
line with their Director-General status – the necessary support.
These  bureaucratic  conflicts  quickly  led  the  Member  States  to  intervene, 
suggesting the ‘double-hatting’ of a number of EUSRs and the Commission’s Heads of 
Delegation. However with a view to the External Action Service, all parties have been 
very careful to avoid precedents. Whereas double-hatting in the Macedonia was relatively 
easy with the Commission taking the lead in light of the EU perspective, discussions over 
Addis Abeba, Afghanistan and Bosnia have been more challenging. DG Development, for 
example,  pre-empted the negotiations  on the EUSR’s support staff  in  Addis Abeba by 
appointing a political advisor and only formally informing the EUSR at a later moment. 
Fearing for a situation in which the Commission is taking political posts, most Member 
States felt blindsided.51 In the case of Kabul, the Member States reached a compromise on 
double-hatting, but the Commissioner for External Relations blocked the final agreement. 
She argued that is was against staff regulations to appoint other candidates than the current 
Head of Delegation of the Commission.52 In Bosnia, both institutions were saved a debate 
due to the lack of progress on the ground and resistance of Russia. 
In conclusion, one can thus state that while the bureaucratic rivalry increased after 
the Amsterdam Treaty,  it  was limited to only a number of areas.  In the civilian crisis 
management, the ECOWAS case and with regard to the EUSRs, the Commission felt that 
the Member States and the Council Secretariat sometimes pushed it  too far. When the 
Commission was defending its territory, the situation led to tensions. This was particularly 
the case on issues where it felt that the Member States were duplicating its informational 
role in the policy process.
51 Interviews with national, Commission and Council Secretariat officials.
52 Ibid.
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V Regional Comparison
This article has so far discussed the relationship between the Commission and the Council 
Secretariat across history and foreign policy instruments. There is, however, also variation 
in  their  inter-institutional  relations  across  regions.  The following section discusses  the 
division of labour between both institutions in a number of regions relevant for European 
foreign policy.
1. Western Balkans
European foreign policy towards the Western Balkans must be analysed in  light of the 
accession process. All countries in the region take part in the Stabilization and Association 
Process (SAP),  which constitutes  the main framework for relations  with the European 
Union.53 This process also determines to a large extent the actors on the EU’s side. The 
SAP is a typical Commission-driven policy, where the Commission acts on a mandate of 
the Member States and reports back to them, before they take the decisions. There is a 
clear understanding that the Council Secretariat and its EUSRs do not intervene in this 
process.54 The EUSR/HR in Bosnia thus cannot take executive decisions using the Bonn 
powers  in  fields  that  are  covered  by  the  SAP.  The  same  goes  for  the  EUSR/ICR in 
Kosovo. Outside the scope of the SAP, the Council Secretariat does play a role. It, for 
example, briefs the Member States on issues of stability or the phasing out of the ESDP 
operations. In general, one can state that the Council Secretariat takes the political lead as 
long as there are soldiers and policemen of the Member States on the ground.
It is however important to realize that the political dimension of the SAP tends to 
differ for the individual Western Balkans countries. The Copenhagen political criteria (i.e. 
democracy, human rights, rules of law, and the protection of minorities) are crucial for the 
candidate countries, whereas the dialogue with Kosovo is purely economic and technical. 
Similarly there is a difference between the countries, which have/had an ESDP presence 
(Macedonia, Bosnia, and Kosovo) and which have not (Croatia, Albania, Montenegro and 
Serbia). For Albania and Croatia  the involvement of the Council Secretariat  is next to 
none. In case of Serbia, Solana and the Council Secretariat play a political role due to the  
Kosovo dossier; the Commission provides much of the carrots when Serbia complies. In 
Montenegro, the Council Secretariat played a role with regard to the political question of 
the referendum (2005). The European Commission provided electoral support.
Macedonia is too some extent the casebook example for European foreign policy 
in the Western Balkans (from conflict to candidate status). The relationship between the 
Commission and the Council Secretariat is therefore interesting. During the 2001 crisis, 
Solana (and the NATO) intervened, partially with the incentive of the SAA, and provided 
an ESDP presence (2003-2005). The EUSR was at the time the main actor coordinating 
the work of the international Community. The European Commission initially focussed on 
reconstruction,  coordination  of  international  aid,  and  the  census,  but  was  informally 
consulted on most  dossiers.55 By the time the SAA entered into force and Macedonia 
prepared its membership application (2004), the Commission had taken over the driving 
seat. While the transition in the relations between Commission and Council Secretariat has 
been relatively fluid in case of Macedonia, in Bosnia such a transition is still ahead. Russia  
53 Apart from Kosovo, all countries have signed a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA). Croatia 
and Macedonia are candidates for membership.
54 Interviews with Commission and Council Secretariat officials.
55 Interview with Commission official.
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has so far blocked the phasing out of the Office of the High Representative, which forms 
the corner stone of the transition.
2. Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean
Whereas the SAP constitutes the framework policy for relations with the Western Balkans, 
the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the Barcelona Process  are important for 
the Eastern European and the Mediterranean countries. The content of these framework 
policies also tends to differ significantly per third country: Egypt is not Ukraine; Morocco 
is not Belarus. These are, however, again Commission-driven policies and they include a 
(modest) political dialogue. Through the Community’s exclusive competence in trade and 
its access to first pillar financial instruments, the European Commission is thus involved 
in the formulation of human rights, rule of law and democratization policies towards the 
countries in the Mediterranean. The role of the Council Secretariat, on the other hand, is 
minimal and it only performs its traditional administrative functions.56
For Eastern Europe, there is an inherent tension between short-term stability and 
longer-term relations. In the immediate aftermath of the Orange Revolution, the positions 
of the Commission and the Council Secretariat have, for example, differed over Ukraine. 
While Solana invited Yushchenko to Brussels to talk about the membership perspective, 
the Commission has remained wary of such prospect.57 The short-term relationship with 
Russia has furthermore been too complicated for the Member States. As a result neither 
Solana nor the Commission have recently been able to play a meaningful role, despite the 
fact that the Commission has a key position in the longer-term EU-Russia partnership. 
Solana’s personal role in the Orange Revolution has furthermore complicated his relations 
with  Russia.  This  can  be  seen  as  one  of  the  reasons  why he  initially  did  not  play  a  
mediation role between Russia and Georgia after the conflict broke out in 2008. Prior to 
the conflict, the EU’s involvement in the Caucasus was limited, despite the presence of an 
EUSR, with the European Commission carrying out mostly technical projects.58
Finally with regard to Turkey, the European Commission is clearly in the driving 
seat due to the accession negotiations and previously the Ankara association agreement. 
Within the Commission it is furthermore DG Enlargement rather than DG RELEX that 
does most of the talking. Solana has made some statements on the political situation in 
Turkey, but these are in line with the Commission’s policy. Bilateral  contacts between 
Solana and Turkey are often in the context of wider discussions on the Middle-East given 
Ankara’s good contacts with Iran and Syria.
3. Wider Middle-East
Throughout the  wider  Middle-East,  there  is  also  variation  in  the  involvement  of  the 
Commission and the Council Secretariat. With regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 
Solana and the Council Secretariat play a very visible role. Solana is, on behalf of the 
European Union, a full member of the Quartet and the Council Secretariat has been in 
charge  of the ESDP Rafah Border  mission  (2005-date).  The EU’s  role  as  the  ‘second 
western voice’ is significant in this context.59 This is one of the reasons why, despite all the 
difficulties, the Palestinian Authority is still willing to talk. Equally important, though less 
visible, is the role of the Commission. In 2007, it committed over 550 million euro in 
56 Interviews with Commission and Council Secretariat officials.
57 Spence, see note 1.
58 Interview with Council Secretariat official.
59 C. Hill, ‘The Capability-Expectations Gap or Conceptualizing Europe's International Role’ (1993) 31 
Journal of Common Market Studies, pp. 305-28.
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assistance to the Palestinian territories. This made the European Commission the single 
biggest  donor.  As  Chris  Patten  states:  ‘I  am not  sure  that  … we  could  count  many 
achievements  for  all  [our]  effort  … [but]  without  our  help  the  [Palestinian] Authority 
would probably have collapsed’.60
European foreign policy towards Iraq is different. The Council Secretariat – apart 
from training police agents outside Iraq – only plays a very marginal political role due to 
disagreement amongst Member States. The European Commission, on the other hand, has 
provided Iraq with almost one billion euro of assistance.61 This makes it the biggest donor 
after the United States and Japan. Due to its presence on the ground and having the longest  
serving EU ambassador in Iraq, it is the Commission rather than the Council Secretariat, 
which is involved in political questions. This does not concern security issues, but it is 
involved in the registration of displaced people and ensuring a representative government. 
Since displaced people are often not of the same ethnicity as the ruling Shia party, such 
governance, democratization and electoral support is important in terms of the longer-term 
development of the country.
At the other side of the spectrum is the EU’s relationship with Iran. The Council 
Secretariat and the EU3 are in the driving seat when dealing with the non-proliferation 
dossier. While to this date Solana’s efforts have not been particularly successful, he has 
been the main negotiator for the Western world and even publically for the EU3+3 (US, 
Russia, and China). The European Commission, on the other hand, provides most of the 
carrots for Iran in case it complies. It stands ready to make a whole range of instruments 
available, but to this date the Commission’s activities are very much on hold. With regard 
to sanctions, it follows the political lead of the Council Secretariat and the Member States.
62 The fact that the European Commission does not have a delegation in Teheran also 
limits the prospects for political reporting.
While  in  the  Israeli-Palestinian  conflict,  the  functions  of  the  Commission  and 
Council are complementary, and while in Iraq and Iran they do not compete, in the case of 
Afghanistan there is  some overlap.  The Commission  again makes significant  financial 
contributions (1.2 billion euro over 2002-2007) and it feels that it should have a political 
say as well.  The Council  Secretariat has recently become in charge of the Afghanistan 
ESDP police mission of approximately 400 police agents, despite initial problems with 
deployment due to procurement conflicts with the Commission and security issues with 
NATO. The close involvement of the Commission and the Council Secretariat on political 
dossiers was also the main reason why the Member States suggested double-hatting of the 
EUSR and the Head of Delegation. 
4. Sub-Saharan Africa and the Developing World
Traditionally sub-Saharan Africa and the Developing World has been the prerogative of 
the Commission. Under the Lomé conventions and the Cotonou agreement, development 
aid (European Development Fund, EDF) was intertwined for the African, Caribbean and 
Pacific (ACP) states with preferential trade agreements. The only exception used to be the 
appointment of the EU Special Envoy/Representative to the Great Lakes Region (1996-
date) after the Rwanda genocide. In recent years, however, the African continent has seen 
nine  ESDP operations  (in  Chad,  Congo,  Guinea-Bissau,  Sudan  and  Somalia)  and  the 
appointment of another two EU Special Representatives (Sudan and the African Union). 
Initially  these  Council  Secretariat  activities  developed in parallel  to  the  Commission’s 
60 Patten, see note 39, p. 156-157.
61 Interview with Commission official.
62 Interviews with national and Commission officials.
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development policy, but it inevitably led to some tensions with regard to representation on 
the ground as well as to calls for EU consistency between security and development.
While  in  most  countries  in  Africa,  the  Commission  along  with  the  individual 
Member States continues to  be the most  important  player,  the Council  Secretariat  has 
taken a leadership role in Congo and in Dafur/Chad. Whereas the first operation Artemis 
(2003) could be described as testing the ESDP military structures outside Europe and not 
as contributing too much to the political situation in Congo, the follow-up operations in 
Africa  have  been  more  substantial,  purpose-orientated,  and  part  of  the  development 
strategies.  Yet  there still  remains  a  compartmentalisation  between the first  and second 
pillar  in  Africa  and the  developing  world.  The incumbent  bureaucracy  is  furthermore 
defending what it considers its  domaine réservé. Lastly, in areas which do not have an 
ESDP presence or a EUSR, the role of the Council Secretariat is still very limited.
In terms of the regional comparison, this article thus has shown that the roles of the 
Commission and the Council Secretariat in third countries depend on the foreign policy 
instruments,  which determine the actors.  In the Western Balkans and the Middle-East, 
there is a striking difference in the variation of foreign policy instruments. In states outside  
the EU’s regional sphere of influence, there are differences between the first and second 
pillar  instruments  and  as  a  result  the  Commission  and  the  Council  Secretariat  hardly 
interact.  Only  in  a  limited  number  of  instances  there  is  some  overlap  between  their 
activities, most notably during the transitional phases in Macedonia and Bosnia, in the 
EU’s dealings with the Ukraine and in Afghanistan. 
VI Conclusion
This  article  has discussed the  relationship between the  European Commission and the 
Council  Secretariat  in  European  foreign  policy.  It  has  shown  that  inter-institutional 
relations become tenser when there is a lack of clarity, perceived overlap or competition in 
roles. Historically, the roles of both institutions were clear under the Single European Act 
and  Maastricht.  Only  when  the  Council  Secretariat  started  to  challenge  the  European 
Commission after Amsterdam ‘as an alternative centre for ideas, policy input and debate’, 
the  incumbent  bureaucracy  started  to  defend  its  informational  role.63 Over  time,  both 
institutions have found a modus vivendi, which has informally clarified some of the grey 
areas. This pragmatic approach could, however, not overcome the structural problems with 
regard to the roles of both institutions,  as for example displayed in the Constitutional 
debate and the ECOWAS case.
An  analysis  of  the  foreign  policy  instruments  shows  variation  in  the  inter-
institutional relationship as well. While the creation of military expertise in the Council 
Secretariat was not perceived as a problem by the Commission, the informational overlap 
in civilian crisis management was an issue. Both institutions were clearly competing for 
the same resources.  This article has also shown that institutional issues are at stake in 
external representation on the ground, because of overlapping functional roles:  double-
hatting remains difficult and the strict staff and budgetary regulations have been used by 
the Commission. In terms of the regional division of labour, the relationship very much 
depends on the overlap of foreign policy instruments in third states. This is particularly the 
case in the Western Balkans and Middle East. Despite that the relationship is instrument-
driven on the ground, there has been little evolution in both regions as regards political 
leadership; yet in the Western Balkans such transition might still be ahead.
While the tensions between the Commission and the Council Secretariat inevitably 
lead to a number of inconsistencies, it is only fair to put it into perspective. At the national 
63 Interview with Council Secretariat official.
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level,  the external relations ministries are also often split  and their  relationship is also 
sometimes notoriously difficult. Avoiding the concentration of power also has its merits 
(e.g. political/military split). The general fear – expressed prior to the Amsterdam – that 
inter-institutional  relations  would  be  difficult  across  the  board  has  furthermore  not 
materialized. That having been said, this article has pointed at a number of specific issues, 
which can be targeted, if political will allows it. 
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